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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
I) STRATEGIC DELEGATION UNDER SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION
II) CONSISTENT LOCATION CONJECTURES UNDER SPATIAL PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
III) HOW TO LICENSE A TRANSPORT INNOVATION
by
Zheng Wang

The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor John S. Heywood

This dissertation consists of three papers that use models of spatial price discrimination to
explore issues of long-standing interest in microeconomics. The first essay introduces
strategic delegation into the traditional model of spatial price discrimination. In both
simultaneous and sequential location cases, delegating location choices to managers
causes firms to move toward each other. This movement typically reduces social welfare.
While exceptions exist for high cost convexity and for some cases of elastic demand, this
reduction reverses the increase in welfare associated with delegation in common quantity
games outside the spatial context. The second paper uniquely explores consistent location
conjectures in a model of spatial price discrimination. With linear production cost, firms
locate too close to the center resulting in reduced social welfare relative to Nash
conjectures. Thus, the frequent association of spatial price discrimination with efficiency
vanishes when firms anticipate their rival's response. With quadratic production cost, the
ii

firms continue to locate closer to the center but the degree of convexity determines
whether or not welfare increases or decreases relative to Nash. The third paper identifies
the optimal method to license an innovation that reduces transport cost in a model of
duopolists engaging in spatial price discrimination. An inside innovator finds licensing by
either a typical fixed fee or an output royalty to be unprofitable. Instead, a fee based on
distance is shown to be a profitable option. An outside innovator finds the fixed fee more
profitable than either a royalty or distance fee. It will license to either one or both firms
and when it does license to both firms, it exploits a prisoner’s dilemma between the
duopolists in order to license an innovation that reduces their profit.
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THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
I) STRATEGIC DELEGATION UNDER SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

2
1. Introduction
The separation between ownership and control makes delegation, empowering
someone to act on behalf of another, the hallmark of the modern corporation. Yet,
economists view delegation in two very distinct fashions. First, it stands as an expression
of agency problems in which monitoring, incentives, and control systems are needed to
align the interests of the principal and agent (see Gibbons 2005 and Prendergast 1999).
Second, it represents an opportunity to commit to competitive strategies that are in the
interest of the principal, but which would not be credible to rivals without delegation. In
this second view, delegation profitably stops the alignment of the interests of the
principal and agent. In the classic case, the owner commits to an incentive contract that
rewards a manager for output, sales, or market share, and thereby creates a more
aggressive manager. As this manager responds to the incentive contract by producing
more, it causes rivals to reduce their output, and can ultimately increase the owner's profit
(Vickers 1985; Fershtman and Judd 1987; Sklivas 1987). While illustrations in the
literature on the use of strategic delegation are enormous, its basic insights have not been
applied to the standard model of spatial price discrimination.1 As we make clear, such an
application is fruitful, and provides predictions that would not typically be drawn from
the literature outside the spatial context.
Examining delegation in spatial models is warranted because such models have
proven especially useful in capturing aspects of competition in horizontally differentiated
markets as emphasized by Tirole (1988). Specifically, they provide a general method for
examining markets in which either actual location or an ordered product characteristic
differentiates output. Thus, airline flights between city pairs differ by departure time from
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early morning to late evening, the editorial policies of newspapers differ from liberal left
to conservative right, and breakfast cereals differ in their sugar content. Among the more
popular spatial models is that of spatial price discrimination, in which the price a firm is
able to charge depends upon how "close" it is to its rivals. Thisse and Vives (1988) show
that such pricing is the preferred alternative when firms are able to adopt it, and Greenhut
(1981) identifies it as "nearly ubiquitous" among actual markets with substantial freight
costs. Thus, our study of delegation in the context of spatial price discrimination has
salience as well as being a sensible extension of the existing literature.
In the classic application outside the spatial context, there exists a prisoner's
dilemma in which each owner has a competitive incentive to create more aggressive
managers, but all owners suffer reduced profits (and enhanced social welfare) when all
managers are aggressive. Thus, each owner rewards his manager for output, and as a
consequence, total market output increases. In this way, the choice of strategic
delegation becomes part of a subgame perfect equilibrium that improves social welfare
relative to a simultaneous quantity game without delegation. We will show that this is
typically not the result in spatial price discrimination. Although delegation and more
aggressive managers result as part of the equilibrium, the consequence is often
diminished social welfare.
There have been several examinations of delegation in the spatial context but
none consider spatial price discrimination in which delivery is included in the price.
Instead, they assume Hotelling type models with mill pricing. Matsumura and
Matsushima (2012) imagine delegating both location and price choices in a setting
analogous to zoning. They imagine Hotelling competition with a uniform market on a
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line segment, and consider a policy that either prohibits or allows duopolists to locate
outside the market. Under delegation, the prohibition diminishes consumer welfare but
the locations themselves (both with and without the prohibition) are actually unchanged
by delegation. As will be seen, locations change dramatically with delegation in our
model of spatial price discrimination.
In addition to this examination of “complete delegation,” other researchers
explore “partial delegation.” Liang et al. (2011) model delegation in an "uncovered"
Hotelling model.2 They assume owners adopt locations in a first stage, and then set a
delegation contract for managers who compete in either price or quantity in a second
stage. They show that the form of second stage competition does not influence location.
Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2005) imagine owners delegate the price decision but
can decide whether or not to delegate location decisions in the final stage. In equilibrium,
neither firm delegates the location decision. As price choices are strategic complements
to managers, the firms locate farther away from each other than without delegation. Zhao
(2012) imagines three choice variables: location, R&D, and price. He assumes that
owners retain the location choice but are able to delegate R&D investment and price. In
equilibrium, the partial delegation involves delegating only the price decision to the
managers. Each owner locates his firm farther away from his rival to increase the product
variety, and the level of R&D investment and price are higher.
In the context of spatial price discrimination, we follow the early tradition of
examining a delegation contract that rewards quantity. Yet, with the typical assumptions
that the entire market is served and that demand is inelastic, a one-to-one correspondence
exists between rewarding output and rewarding market share (Jansen et al. 2007; Ritz
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2008). This may be reassuring because market share often stands as an explicit objective
in the performance standards generated by compensation committees of boards of
directors (Borkowski 1999).
In what follows, we start with two firms engaging in spatial price discrimination
with linear production costs and simultaneous location choices on a linear market with
inelastic demand. We show that delegation of location is adopted in equilibrium. This
adoption causes the firms to locate closer together, and as a consequence, it increases
social cost. We then modify this basic case along a series of dimensions. First, we allow
for sequential location decisions. Following the literature outside the spatial context, we
show that only the second mover has an incentive to delegate, but again delegation
increases social cost. Second, we retain two firms with simultaneous location choices but
assume convex production costs. This case is important, as Gupta (1994) shows that
spatial price discrimination with convex costs generates inefficient locations even without
delegation, as each firm tries to give away its high cost marginal customer to its rival.
We show that allowing delegation in this case can either improve or hurt welfare
depending upon the degree of cost convexity. Third, we return to the basic case, but
generalize to n firms, showing that the basic insight remains with welfare being
diminished. Finally, we consider elastic demand in a duopoly. Delegation continues to
cause the firms to move toward each other and harms welfare as long as transport costs
are not large. Thus, the consequences of delegation under spatial price discrimination
depend on the particular assumptions, but we emphasize that they are clearly not those
that would be anticipated from the literature on delegating quantity decisions in typical
oligopolies.
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In the next section, we set up the basic duopoly model of spatial price
discrimination with linear production costs and delegation. We next derive the subgame
perfect equilibrium, and compare to the case without the possibility of delegation.
Subsequent sections consider each of the extensions isolated above, and a final section
concludes the paper by suggesting avenues for further research.

2. Solving for Equilibrium in the Basic Model
In the basic model, two firms engage in spatial price discrimination, and the game
is structured with four potential stages. In the first stage, the owner decides whether or
not to delegate the location choice to a manager by providing an incentive contract. If
they decide to do so, the terms of the incentive contract are simultaneously chosen in the
second stage. We imagine owners provide an incentive contract that has convex weights
on profit and output. Given the chosen incentive weights, managers adopt locations in the
third stage and the price schedule is determined in the final stage given the locations. The
subgame perfect equilibrium is determined by backward induction. Thus, our model
represents a case of partial delegation because we retain spatial price discrimination
rather than delegating price schedules as a strategic variable.3
To show the backward induction, we first describe the nature of the pricing
equilibrium given locations. We imagine consumers are uniformly distributed along a
unit line segment. Each consumer has inelastic demand for one unit of the good, with
reservation price r. Two firms compete with a common constant marginal cost of
production which we normalize to zero without loss of generality. Transport cost is t per
unit of distance.  and  are firm locations with    . The equilibrium delivered
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price schedule for any consumer located at x is   ,  , 

max  

,  

  . As shown in Figure 1, the bold envelope represents the price schedule. It is the
upper envelope of the rival's transport cost. By convention, the indifferent customer
(faces the same delivered price from either firm) can purchase from either firm. That
customer has location
2 as 
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<Insert Figure 1 about here>

Given the pricing equilibrium, the profits of the two firms follow as:



  




       



  



    



    

          




(1)

(2)

and these are identified in Figure 1. Note that for any given locations, owners would not
delegate the pricing decision to managers.4
Managers determine locations under delegation and they do so to maximize their
respective incentive contracts. Managers are paid based on incentive contracts that retain
weight ! on firm profit and weight (1  !) on firm’s output, with 0 # !  1:
$

$

!   1  ! 

!   1  ! 

(3)
(4)
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Thus, (1) and (2) are substituted into (3) and (4) and each manager maximizes their
earnings (incentive contract) with respect to their location. This yields two best response
functions in which the location of one firm depends upon the location of the other firm:





1  !   ! /3! 

1  !   2!   ! /3! 

(5)

(6)

Solving simultaneously yields the optimal locations:



We note that

*
*+

# 0 and

*
*+

3!  !  2! !   2! ! /8! ! 

!  3!  6! !   2! ! /8! ! 

, 0 for any !

(7)

(8)

! # 1. These movements toward the

corners reflect the change that t makes in managers balancing the loss in profit and the
gain in output caused by the incentive parameter. For given locations, as t increases,
profit increases meaning that for a given incentive parameter movement toward the
middle now entails a greater reduction in profit for a given increase in output.5 Thus, all
else equal, managers do not move as far toward the middle when t is large.

Given these locations, owners determine the optimal incentive parameters ! and

! . Plugging equations (7) and (8) into equations (1) and (2) each owner maximizes his
own profit with respect to his manager's incentive parameter. This yields two best

response functions of one owner's incentive parameter as a function of the other owner's
parameter. Solving the response functions simultaneously yields the equilibrium
incentive parameters:
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!

!

3/3  

(9)

The incentive parameters on profit decrease as t increases. Owners who want managers to
be more aggressive and locate toward the middle, know that smaller weights on profit are
required when t is large. The larger t increases the size of profit and otherwise makes
managers less willing to move toward the center as described above. The owner
responds by reducing the weight on profit.
Returning (9) to (7) and (8) yields the equilibrium locations at the thirds:


.333 and 

.667

(10)

Although the incentive parameters depend on t, the firms’ locations do not depend on t.
This happens because t cancels out as a result of the linearity of transport and production
costs and the symmetry of the problem. In essence, the owner wishes his manager to
seek an optimal location, and adjusts the incentive parameter to achieve this location.
Returning (10) to (1) and (2) yields:
 =  = .139t

(11)

Thus, (9), (10), and (11) characterize the equilibrium on the assumption that each owner
adopts delegation if the choice is available. We now show that such adoption will occur.

Proposition 1: When delegation is available, it will be chosen and the equilibrium will
be as identified in (9), (10), and (11).
Proof: The payoffs for the choices of each firm are shown in Table 1.
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<Table 1 about here>

The profit for both owners delegating is in (11), and that for both choosing no delegation
comes from Hurter and Lederer (1985) and equals 1

.188. The off diagonal terms

have only one firm adopting delegation and are symmetric. Their derivation is presented
in Appendix 1. Delegating is the dominant strategy.

Given that the delegation game will emerge in equilibrium, we compare it to the
traditional equilibrium without delegation. While profits and locations can be
immediately compared, social welfare (SW) follows as the difference between total
willingness to pay and the transport cost (TC):

SW = r – TC where TC








 2   




  1  




(12)

With this, we summarize the comparison.

Proposition 2: With delegation, i) locations are closer to the center, ii) profits are lower,
and iii) social welfare is lower than without delegation.
Proof: The equilibrium in (9), (10), and (11) is compared to that without delegation.
i) Without delegation, ′
    4′  ′ 5

ii) 1  1′

.167 # 0.

.139  .188

iii) From (12), SW(
8  .125 < 0.

.25 and ′

.75 (Hurter and Lederer 1985). Thus,

.049 # 0.

.333, 

.667 - SW(′

.25, ′

.75

(8  .139 
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Our presentation reproduces much of the logic from outside the spatial context but
with rather different outcomes. There remains an inherent prisoner's dilemma at the heart
of our delegation game. Each owner benefits from unilaterally providing an incentive for
his manager to locate aggressively but each owner suffers losses when both managers
receive such incentives. Under delegation, each manager moves toward the middle under
delegation in an effort to capture output. Moreover, just as incentive contracts need not
alter the market shares outside the spatial context, our two firms continue to split the
market evenly even with incentive contracts that serve to move the two firms toward each
other. Yet, the typical assumption of inelastic demand in our presentation means that the
ability to delegate actually wastes resources. Delegation results in an 11% increase in
transport costs. Thus, while a social planer prefers delegation in a typical quantity game
outside the spatial context, the planer would prefer its absence in a market characterized
by spatial price discrimination.6

3. First Extension: Sequential Location
In this extension, we retain the set-up of the basic model but imagine that
locations choices are sequential rather than simultaneous. Sequential location can be seen
as the analog to Stackelberg leadership in which one firm commits earlier to an output
(Neven 1987). This early commitment typically results in the leader producing more than
the follower and in total output and so social welfare being higher than in the
simultaneous Cournot model.7 Yet, sequential locations in spatial price discrimination
deviate substantially from the first best locations associated with simultaneous choice and
so are associated with lower social welfare. Gupta (1992) shows that in duopoly, the
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location leader locates at .4 and the follower at .8. This opens the possibility that
delegation may either improve or harm welfare in the context of spatial price
discrimination.
The derivation remains the same except that within the location subgame firm 1

now locates first. Thus, the manager of firm 2 maximizes (4) with respect to  knowing

 the location of firm 1. The best response function is:


9: + : +:
;: +

(13)

firm 1’s manager returns this best response function to (3) and maximizes with respect to
 . Firm 1’s location is:


3!  !  2! !   2! ! /5! ! 

(14)

Returning equation (14) to equation (13), firm 2’s location in terms of the incentive
parameters is:


2!  !  4! !   ! ! /5! ! 

(15)

Given equations (14) and (15), each owner maximizes profit with respect to their
own incentive parameters. This yields two best response functions of one firm's incentive
parameter as function of the other. Solving simultaneously yields the equilibrium
incentive parameters:
!

1 and !

7/7  4

(16)
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Note that the location leader ultimately does not delegate and simply maximizes profit.
This result carries over from the Stackelberg game in which the leader also never has an
incentive to delegate (see Kopel and Loffler 2008 and Lekeas and Stamatopoulos 2011).
In our case, the leader knows the complete best response function of the follower
including exactly how far the follower will retreat in the face of its advances. As a
consequence, it has no incentive to tell its manager to locate any closer to the middle than
implied by profit maximization.8
Note that the follower's incentive parameter gets smaller (more emphasis is placed
on output) as t increases. As in the simultaneous case, as t increases the follower earns
more profit and so its manager is more reluctant to move toward the middle. This can be
overcome only by the owner placing more emphasis on output.9
Returning equation (16) to equations (14) and (15) yields:


.286 and 

.571

(17)

Again the linearity and symmetry of the problem causes t to cancel yielding unique
locations. Returning these to equations (1) and (2) yields:


.102 and 

.143

(18)

As in the basic model, the equilibrium characterized by (16), (17), and (18) will be that
adopted by the two firms if given a choice over the ability to delegate.10
This allows us to identify the consequences of delegation with sequential location.

14
Proposition 3: When compared to the simultaneous location model, sequential location
choice results in locations that i) provide greater output to the follower, ii) have lower
total profit, and iii) have lower social welfare.
Proof:

i) Given (17), 

.429 and 

.571 rather than 



0.5 as in (10).

ii) Subtracting the sum of profits in (11) from that in (18) yields -.033t < 0.
iii) From (12), SW(
8  .139) < 0.

.286, 

.571) - SW(

.333, 

.667 = (8  .153 -

Allowing sequential location lowers profit and welfare while causing the follower to earn
more than the leader. While the disadvantage for the leader also happens under delegation
in a Stackelberg game, the other consequences differ. In the Stackelberg game, total
output and social welfare are larger than in the Cournot game with delegation (Lekeas
and Stamatopoulos 2011). In spatial price discrimination, location leadership lowers
welfare. Thus, the social planner prefers leadership in a quantity game with delegation
but prefers simultaneous choice in a location game with delegation.
We now examine the implication of delegation given sequential location choices.

Proposition 4: Allowing delegation in a model of sequential location, i) causes the
follower to produce more than the leader, ii) reduces total profit, and iii) reduces social
welfare.
Proof:

i) Without delegation 

.4 and 

delegation (17) implies that   

.8 (Gupta 1992) and   
.143 # 0.

.2 , 0. With
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ii) Subtracting the sum of profits given 

iii) From (12), SW(
 8  .14 # 0.

.286, 

.4 and 

.571 - SW(

.8 from (18) yields -.075t < 0.

.4, 

.8

8  .153 

The critical insight is that delegation allows the follower to commit to behavior that
would not make sense in a simultaneous location game. Thus, as the follower puts more
and more emphasis on output, it is telling its manager to locate increasingly close to the
market center regardless of the location of the leader. This commitment gets built into the
profit maximizing behavior of the leader who backs further away from the middle
knowing the follower will be close to it. This yields the asymmetric locations and large
advantage to the follower.
Comparisons to the typical Stackelberg model are again valuable. In such a model
allowing delegation also causes the outputs of the leader and follower to reverse such that
the follower produces more than the leader. Delegation also causes total profits to be
reduced. Nonetheless, the critical social cost comparison differs. In the Stackelberg
model, social welfare is higher when delegation is available. Allowing leadership in our
location game generates an aggressive strategy by the follower’s owner that causes
greater asymmetry and lower social welfare. This is important as even absent delegation,
sequential entry generated highly asymmetric and wasteful locations. Adding leadership
lowers social welfare even further.
It is worth noting that while we have followed the literature modeling delegation
in a Stackelberg quantity game (Kopel and Loffler 2008; Lekeas and Stamatopoulos
2011), other timings may be reasonable. The critical point is that time passes between any
firm's delegation and location decision. Thus, one alternative timing could have firm 1 set
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its incentive parameter, firm 2 then set its incentive parameter and then the sequential
locations are chosen. We briefly consider this timing.
The profit functions and the incentive contracts are as in (1), (2), (3), and (4).
With backward induction, we first solve the sequential location game and so (14) and (15)
remain the same. The owner of firm 2 maximizes profit with respect to ! yielding
!

<:

922+: :

. This is returned to (14) and (15) and placed in the profit function of

firm 1. Maximizing, the owner of firm 1 sets !


0.67, 

0.11, and 

=

=+

yielding !

=

=2+

, 

0.086. In this case, firm 1 retains a leadership

0.44,

advantage as it anticipates firm 2’s best response in both the delegation stage and the
location game. Yet, in this timing firm 2 retains the ability to commit through delegation
and the equilibrium in some ways mirrors the simultaneous location game with the firms
ultimately moving toward each other.
A second alternative timing could have firm 1 adopting both its incentive
parameter and location before firm 2 adopts an incentive parameter. Clearly, there is no
ability for firm to commit through delegating. Returning (13) to (2) yields firm 2’s profit
as a function of ! ,  , and t and the owner of firm 2 maximizes profit by setting !

1.

As a consequence, the owner of firm 1 has no incentive to have his manager locate more
aggressively than implied by profit maximization. The equilibrium results are thus
identical to those without delegation (Gupta 1992): 


0.12.

0.4, 

0.8, 

0.2, and

As this discussion shows, the extent to which firm 2 can use delegation to
credibly commit to aggressive behavior depends on the exact timing of the game. Our
propositions focus on the case analogous to that examined in the Stackelberg game and
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that which allows the greatest ability to commit. While we think it is one possible timing,
we recognize that others could also be reasonable.

4. Second Extension: Convex Production Cost
We now return to the assumption of simultaneous location from the basic model
but substitute linear production costs with convex production costs. Such a substitution is
potentially important as Gupta (1994) shows that under spatial price discrimination, firms
with convex production costs locate inefficiently. Convex costs generate an incentive for
the firms to move toward their respective corners in order to yield customers to their rival.
This movement increases the rival’s marginal cost and so their delivered price. In turn,
the increased rival's price increases the profit earned on the infra-marginal customers
retained by the original firm. Yet, in equilibrium each firm behaves this way causing the
locations to remain symmetric but outside the efficient quartiles. As we have shown that
delegation generates more aggressive managers that move toward each other, assuming
convex production costs might provide a case of delegation improving welfare, reversing
the demonstrations of the earlier sections.
We follow Gupta (1994) assuming each firm's delivered price is the sum of
marginal production cost plus transport cost and we adopt quadratic production costs
>?




@1 for i=1,2. As a consequence, the equilibrium delivered price schedule for any

consumer located at x is   ,  , 

@1 



 , where



max |   |  @  , |  | 

still represents firm 1’s output and 1 



is firm 2’ s output. The

price schedule is the sum of rival’s transport cost and marginal production cost. Utilizing
the price charged to the indifferent consumer, it follows that firm 1’s output is 
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B+ 
B+

and so potentially depends on the degree of convexity, k.11 The resulting

profits functions are:




  



 @1 
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@1 
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 @1 





(19)

     

(20)

Placing (19) and (20) into (3) and (4), each manager maximizes his incentive
contract with respect to his location. Simultaneously solving the resulting best response
functions yields:
 4! @ ; !  8! @   8@  ! !  15! @  !  14@! !  16! @  !  ! @ 
15! @  6!    4!   !  4!  ; !  2!   /8! ! 2 ;  9@   4@ ;  11@  

(21)

 28! @ ; !  73! @  !  8@  ! !  8! @   15@!   56! @  !  14! @!
! @  2!    6!    12!  ; !  4!   ! /8! ! 2 ;  9@   4@ ;  11@  
(22)

Given (21) and (22), each owner maximizes profit given the incentive parameter of his
rival. This generates two best response functions in terms of the incentive parameters that
when solved simultaneously yield:
!

!

28@   15@  6  /16@   @    4@   30@  4 ;  12 

(23)

Note that the incentive parameters with linear costs (9) are recovered when k=0.
Returning (23) to (21) and (22) yields:


@   3@  2  /8@   15@  6 

(24)
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7@   12@  4  /8@   15@  6 

(25)

Again, (24) and (25) generalize the linear case such that if k=0, we recover the locations
at the thirds, .333 and .667. Moreover, if we set the values of (24) and (25) to the efficient
locations of .25 and .75 and solve for k, it emerges that k=.425t. Thus for this value of
convexity, the locations chosen under delegation will be efficient indicating that there is
clearly scope for delegation to increase welfare.
We present additional detail on the equilibrium in the following proposition.

Proposition 5: When both firms delegate under convex production cost, i)
and ii)

*:C
*B

, 0.

* 9
*B

,0

Proof:
i)

* 9
*B

ii) D!1 /D@
4 ;



29@   20@  12  /8@   15@  6  >0.
2  17@   52@  36  /@    16@   30@  4@   12  

>0.

Thus, for larger k the owners adopt less aggressive managers (ii) and their managers
locate farther away from each other (i). This implies that owners with convex costs will
place less weight on output than those with linear costs.12 This reflects the continued
desire to turn the marginal customer over to the rival as driven by the cost convexity.
Nonetheless, the influence of delegation may be most important for large k, as this is
when there is the largest incentive to move toward the corners in the absence of
delegation (Gupta 1994).
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To examine the influence of delegation we first identify the equilibrium profits
and social welfare. Returning (24) and (25) to (19) and (20) yields the profits:




E2B F ;E B G +<H;B I +  <JB  + I ;
JJB  HB+E+  

B+ G 2 + F

(26)

Social welfare is the difference between consumers’ willingness to pay and total social
cost. The social cost is now the sum of transport cost and production cost:

SW = r – SC where
SC=  
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(27)

First, we note that the profits in (26) can be used as part of confirming that the
delegation equilibrium will be chosen. The proof is in Appendix 2. Second, we
summarize the welfare effects by evaluating (27) by subtracting the value without
delegation from that with delegation. This difference we label ∆LM.

Proposition 6: With quadratic production cost and delegation: i) profits decline and ii)
social welfare increases when the degree of convexity is larger than 0.248t and decreases
when the degree of convexity is less than 0.248t.
Proof: i) See Appendix 2.
ii) Plugging (24) and (25) into equation (27) yields
SW= 8 
Plugging 

+B

JB+

J +B G 2H;B I +  ;;<B + I  B+ G  + F E2B F

and 

2JB  HB+E+  

E+<B

JB+

(Gupta 1994) into equation (27) yields

(28)
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SW= 8 

2+ I EB+  +B  JB I
;B+ 

(29)

Subtracting equation (29) from equation (28) yields
∆LM

+  4EB F =;+B G JJ+  B I 22+ I B  E+ G B9E+ F 5
;JB  HB+E+   B+ 

(30)

Setting equation (30) equal to zero and solving yields a single real root at k=0.248t. It can
be checked that (30) is positive (negative) for larger (smaller) values of k.N

With linear production cost, firms locate efficiently without delegation and
proposition 2 shows that they then move toward each other with delegation. Thus, when k
is small (only slightly larger than zero), firm locations without delegation are close to
efficient and their movements toward each other with delegation are similar to those
when k=0. As a consequence, when k is small, the result in Proposition 6 ii) mimics that
in Proposition 2 -- social welfare diminishes with delegation. Yet, when k is large the
firms without delegation locate far away from the efficient locations (toward the corners).
The movement toward each other caused by delegation improves efficiency in this case.
Thus for the first time, we have found that delegation can improve social welfare. The
requirement is that the cost function must be sufficiently convex.

5. Third Extension: N Firms
In this subsection, we return to the basic model with linear costs (normalized to

zero) and imagine n firms instead of two. Firm location is designated by 1 , i = 1…n with

1 O 1 . The equilibrium delivered price schedule is   , 1 , 1

 

if
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  ;   , 1 , 1

  , 1 , 1

 if 1 

max  1 , 1 

  P9 if

O P .

 1 ;

Given the delivered price schedule, we identify firms’ profits. The profit of firm 1
is in equation (1) and profit of firm n is:
P

Q

RQS TRQ   P9  P 

     P9    P 


(31)

Q



A representative interior firm has profit:
1

+

2

1  19



 2 1  19
+

The manager of an interior firm maximizes $1

respect to 1 and the best response function is:
1



 2 1  1
+



!1 1  1  !1 

(32)
CT 9CS


with

CT CS


(33)

This quickly shows that the incentive parameter is irrelevant. In the two firm case, either
firm can increase its output by moving toward the other. If an interior firm moves toward
one rival to gain output, it gives up exactly the same output to its rival on the other side.
Thus, an interior firm can do no better than locating in the middle of its rivals. As a
consequence, the interior firms locate symmetrically between the corner firms:
1

P91  19 Q
P9

In contrast to an interior firm, a corner firm has no rival on one side and so by
being more aggressive can gain output and force the remaining firms to retreat. The

(34)
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obvious problem is that if it pushes too far, an interior firm will simply jump over the
corner firm to establish itself in the corner. Thus, under delegation, the owners of firm 1
and n must set an incentive parameter that maximizes profit subject to the constraint that
the manager locates so as to retain the corner position. To solve this constrained

maximization we recognize the “no jump constraint” is binding for all U O 3 and work
back through location problem to identify the appropriate incentive parameter.
The manager of firm 1 continues to adopt its location to maximize the incentive
contract and only cares about its rival firm 2. Thus, the location chosen by the manager
depends on that of firm 2 exactly as in (5): 

1  !   ! /3! . The owner of

firm 1 can use this reaction function to set the associated incentive parameter once it
knows the location implied by the no jump condition.
To determine the no jump location plugging (34) into (32) to yield the profit of
firm 2 located in the interior:


+ 9Q 
P9 

If firm 2 jumps to the left corner it maximizes profit by locating at 


+

;

(35)

; 


and earns

  . The farthest right location for firm 1 that prohibits jumping is determined

by setting this profit equal to (35) and solving for  (recognizing P


√6U  √6  6 /2U  2U  5

1   ).

(36)

and analogously
P

2U  U√6  4  √6  4 /2U  2U  5

(37)
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It can be checked that the corner firms move toward the edges as n increases. It also
follows from (34) that:
1

2W4U  1  √65  U√6  2  √6  4 /2U  2U  5

(38)

The owner of firm 1 returns (36) and (38) to (5) and solves for ! :
!

!P

P 9P9H

P 9+P9P+P√E9H+9H

(39)

This is the incentive parameter that maximizes profit given the constraint that interior
firms will not jump.
Note that the owners place less emphasis on output as the number of firms
increases,

*:C
*P

+√E9
9√EP+√E9+ 

, 0. This follows from the incentive for interior firms

to jump into the corner. As the total number of firms increases, a smaller corner distance
will induce such jumping. Thus, the owners of the corner firms respond to an increase in
the number of firms by decreasing their managers' incentives to move toward the middle.
Social welfare is the difference between total willingness to pay and total
transport cost:

SW = r – TC where TC








 ∑P9
1  1     1  P

2






(40)

As before, we compute the difference between social welfare with delegation and without
delegation, ∆LM.
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Proposition 7: With n firms and linear production cost, social welfare is lower with
delegation.
Proof: Using the locations without delegation, 1

19
P

,W

1,2,3 … U (Hurter and

Lederer, 1985), and the locations with delegation, (36), (37), and (38), ∆LM
Z8 

+PI ;P 9√EP 9J√EP9;P √E;H
2P 9P9H 

all integers n > 1. N

[  Z8 

+

2P

[

+49<√E5P9 9P√E 
2PP 9P9H 

# 0 for

The corner owners adopt delegation and set the incentive parameter to push
managers as far toward the center as the no jump condition allows. As in the two firms
case, this delegation harms welfare. Fundamentally, this extension stresses the
importance of the assumption of a linear spatial market with distinct corners. Clearly, if
the firms locate on a unit circle rather than line segment, there will be no advantage to
using delegation. Any attempt to gain output in one direction is offset by an equal output
loss in the other direction.

6. Fourth Extension: Considering Elastic Demand
We now follow Hamilton et al. (1989) to allow elastic linear demand at each

location: 


1   . The price at x remains the maximum of delivered costs,

max  

,     and the indifferent consumer remains at



=

 


.

Also as in Hamilton et al. (1989), we assume that  < 0.9 to rule out monopoly pricing

and assure that the price schedule (the rival's delivered cost) binds. Thus, firm profits are:


 4 
 



  

51   

   4 



    51 
(41)
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  4     
   



51        4       51 

(42)


Owners delegate the location choice providing a contract that still rewards profit
and quantity. With inelastic demand, rewarding quantity and the share of the unit market
(market share) are identical but this equivalence vanishes with elastic demand.
Anticipating the responses of the managers, the two owners simultaneously choose
incentive parameters.

where 

$

!   1  !  and

 1   


 and 

$

!   1  ! 

(43)

  1      .


Substituting (41) and (42) into (43), the managers of the two firms maximize with
respect to the location choices yielding the two best response functions:



<+:  9<: \J: +   9HE: + 2: :
<+:

<+:  9<: 9\J: +   HE: + 2: : 9HE: +J: +  9HE: +  
<+:

At this point if we were to follow Hamilton et al. (1989 p.94), we would impose
symmetry, 

1   . Yet, the structure of our game prohibits this as imposing

symmetry requires that !

!

! which implicitly removes the stage in which

owners play a game in incentive parameters. At the same time, there is not a tractable
analytic solution to jointly solving (44) and (45) to give locations as functions of

(44)

(45)
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incentive parameters. As a consequence, we approach the owner and manager objective
functions implicitly. We take all the appropriate derivatives from both stages and only
impose symmetry afterward. While even this approach generates higher order terms in t
that prohibit a closed form solution, we can solve the problem for any specific value of t.
As an illustration, set t = 1/2 and return (41) and (42) to the contracts in (43).
Each manager maximizes (43) with respect to their location choice where the partial
derivatives ]
]
]

<

E

0 and ]

*^

*

!   

<

;

*^

*

0 are:

!   !  
;
J

;

;

!   !        ! (46)
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Keeping these in implicit form, differentiate ] _! , ! ,  ! , ! ,  ! , ! ` and

] _! , ! ,  ! , ! ,  ! , ! ` with respect to ! :
*a

 * *:  * *:



0

(48)

*a

 * *:  * *:

0

(49)
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The implicit function theorem and Cramer’s rule give: *:
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With (46) and (47), these yield:

92  < 9 ; J E <:  92: 9<: 
J: : 4< 9; < 9   ;2< 5E:  9 9E:  

(50)
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*:

92  < 9 ; J E <:  9 : 9;: 
J: : 4< 9; < 9   ;2< 5E:  9 9E:  
*h

*h *
* *:

Differentiation of (41) now generates the owner's first order condition, *:

*h *
,
* *:
*h
*:

(51)





as a function of terms we have just derived.
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Having identified the first order conditions for all players, we now impose symmetry,


1   and !

!

!, which with (46) gives  in terms of !:


9H:√9<: H:2
:

(53)

In combination with (50) and (51), returning (53) to (52) and solving for ! yields

!

!

0.86 and in equilibrium, 

0.359, 

0.641, and 



0.048.

Social welfare remains the difference between total surplus and total transport
cost, SW =TS – TC. Surplus at any point x is the sum of consumer surplus,  
total revenue,  1  
iL

 41   









yielding the following:
5   41   



41     5 





5    1    




The cost at any point x is the transport cost to that point times the quantity sold at that
point yielding the following:

and

(54)
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The equilibrium locations imply that TS=0.478, TC=0.056, and SW=0.422. This can be
contrasted to the no delegation equilibrium !




!

1): 

0.27, 

0.73,

0.065, TS=0.468, TC=0.047, and SW=0.421. Thus, delegation causes the

firms to move toward each other with surplus increasing slightly more than costs,

∆LM

0.001.

Repeating the above procedure for t = 0.1, 0.2, …, 0.8 allows the following
characterization (these equilibria are shown in Table 2 and compared to those without
delegation):

Result 6.1: With linear elastic demand, delegation i) moves the firms closer together, ii)
lowers firm profits, iii) increases consumer surplus, and iv) ∆LM # 0 if t=0.1, 0.2, 0.3,

and 0.4 and ∆LM , 0 if t = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8.

The manager increases sales by moving toward the rival and capturing the lower
price, high demand locations. As the firms move toward each other, the price falls at all
locations increasing quantity, revenue and consumer surplus. At the same time, as the
firms move toward each other total transport cost increases (Hamilton et al. 1989). Thus,
a given movement of firms toward each other has offsetting consequences on social
welfare. When t is small, delegation moves the firms toward each other generating a
small reduction in price and so only modest gains in consumer surplus. These gains are
outweighed by the increase in transport cost and the decline in profit. However, when t is
large, the movement toward each other generates a large reduction in the price and large
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gain in consumer surplus. In this case the gain in consumer surplus is larger than the
decline in profit and increase in transport cost. Table 2 shows that delegation decreases
social welfare for the cases of t=0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, but increases welfare for higher
values of t.
While the ultimate influence on social welfare depends on the level of transport
costs, many of the basic insights carry over from the inelastic demand case. When
owners have an incentive to delegate, managers locate closer together. The consequence
for owners remains reduced profitability relative to the case without delegation.
Comparison to the basic model is also valuable. The presence of elastic demand
increases the incentive of mangers to move toward each other. This follows because the
elastic demand means that as the firms move toward each other and the discriminatory
price schedule falls and so the quantity demand increases at all points. Thus, for a given
movement toward the rival, the quantity increases more quickly. Owners recognize this
and so under elastic demand the weight placed on profit is larger. The owners can create
the same aggressiveness with less weight on quantity compared to inelastic demand.

7. Conclusion
In both Cournot and Stackelberg competition delegating quantity choices to
managers results in greater total output and greater social welfare. We model delegating
location decisions to managers under spatial price discrimination and show this creates
more aggressive managers who move toward each other. The impact of this on social
welfare depends on the setting. With linear production costs and inelastic demand,
welfare declines with both simultaneous and sequential location. With convex

31
production costs, welfare can increase but only if there is sufficient convexity. With
elastic demand, welfare will increase for high transport cost but decrease for low
transport cost. Thus, the beneficial effects of delegation identified in quantity games, do
not routinely carry over. We also emphasize the importance of the corner firms in our
linear markets showing that it is the market edge that allows incentive contracts on
quantity to influence location.
These new findings could set the stage for further research. As we have shown
that convexity reduces the weight put on quantity (and so market share), one might be
able to test if market share contracts are less likely or less lucrative in industries
characterized by cost convexity. This fits with a recent call in the management literature
that empirical researchers should begin to examine the determinants of inter-industry
heterogeneity in the use of delegation contacts (Sengul et al. 2012). The structure
(convexity) of costs could be one such determinant.
A second avenue for research might follow recent work by Liu and Serfes (2004)
and Colombo (2009) adopt the Hotelling type model with mill pricing but imagine the
ability to imperfectly price discriminate (the firms know the segment of the market of the
consumer but not the exact location). An issue would be whether delegation influences
location in such a setting. Finally, one might imagine introducing a bargaining game
between owners and managers into the model. Following van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007),
this game would set the incentive parameters. Despite these potential variations, we
emphasize our contribution. We uniquely examine spatial price discrimination and find
that delegation will be adopted and often harms social welfare.
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THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
II) CONSISTENT LOCATION CONJECTURES UNDER SPATIAL PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
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8. Introduction
Despite a long and durable history, the canonical model of spatial price
discrimination has not been solved for an equilibrium generated by consistent location
conjectures. We model such conjectures and present an equilibrium that differs sharply
from that associated with Nash behavior. Instead of the well known symmetric duopoly
locations at the quartiles that minimize transport cost (Hurter and Lederer, 1985), we
confirm a principle of minimum differentiation with the two firms locating at the middle
and maximizing total transport cost. We contrast this result associated with linear
production cost with an otherwise similar equilibrium that assumes convex production
cost. In this latter case, the extent of convexity determines whether the equilibrium
locations improve or detract from the welfare associated with Nash behavior.
Conjectural variations generalize the Nash assumption and are seen as implicitly
modeling the beliefs formation process of each player about the conduct of other. The
solution concept of conjectures that match other players' actual responses has been
identified as more general and superior to Nash. It represents a "consistency of beliefs"
absent in Nash where players stubbornly refuse to learn about the behavior of other
players (See Aliprantis and Chakrabarti, 2000 p. 138).
This generalization has been criticized as it remains fundamentally one-shot with
no explicit maximization of a stream of payoffs and because it can generate out of
equilibrium behavior that can make little sense lacking normal stability properties
(Friedman, 1983 pp. 109–110). Despite this criticism, it remains popular as a substitute
for complete dynamic modeling. Indeed, a substantial literature has embedded static Nash
behavior in a fully dynamic model and isolated the conditions under which the outcomes
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match that of consistent conjectures (see Cabral, 1995 for an early example). As Martin
(2002, p. 51) emphasizes, “These results provide a formal justification for using the static
conjectural variations model as a short cut to analyze inherently dynamic models.” More
recently, Possajennikov (2009) demonstrates that consistent conjectures are
evolutionarily stable for a wide range of well-behaved games and that their use often
simplifies evolutionary analysis. In addition to being a shortcut to full dynamic modeling,
the conjectural variations framework has been used widely in the literature on
oligopolistic product markets (Bresnahan, 1981), the private provision of public goods
(Sugden 1985, Itaya and Shimomura, 2001) and in modeling teamwork (Heywood and
McGinty, 2012). Moreover, it has found practical empirical applications both in bidding
strategies for electric power (Song et al., 2003) and in estimating market power for
antitrust purposes (Perloff et al., 2007).
We bring this equilibrium to spatial models as they have proven especially useful
in capturing aspects of competition in horizontally differentiated markets (Tirole, 1988).
Specifically, they provide a general method for examining markets in which either actual
location or an ordered product characteristic differentiates output. 13 A very limited
literature has considered consistent conjectures in these models but the conjectures are
either not about location itself or the setting is not one of spatial price discrimination.
Thus, Capozza and Van Order (1989) consider a Chamberlin type model in which entry
occurs in the spatial market until profits are zero. Each firm faces uniformly distributed
consumers with downward sloping demand. The conjectures modeled are those of rivals'
reactions to own price changes.14 Mulligan and Fik (1994, 1995) consider both price and
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location conjectures and do so in a typical mill pricing model in which the consumer pays
transport costs thus eliminating the possibility of spatial discrimination.
Spatial price discrimination allows modeling circumstances in which the price
includes delivery and so the price a firm is able to charge depends upon how "close" it is
to its rivals. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that such pricing is the preferred alternative
when firms are able to adopt it and Greenhut (1981) identifies it as "nearly ubiquitous"
among actual products that have substantial freight costs. Thus, our inquiry into location
conjectures in the context of spatial price discrimination maintains salience as well as
being a sensible extension of the existing literature.
In what follows, we first study the case in which two firms spatially price
discriminate with simultaneous choice of locations. With constant marginal cost, the two
firms co-locate resulting in higher social cost than with Nash. When production cost is
quadratic, the two firms do not co-locate but continue to locate closer to each other than
with a Nash assumption. We show that the degree of the cost convexity determines
whether the consistent conjectures equilibrium has higher or lower social cost than the
Nash equilibrium. Next, the assumption of constant marginal costs is recovered and the
number of firms is extended to n. We show that the consistent conjectures equilibrium
continues to result in firms being too close together and so generates higher social cost
than Nash. Finally, we draw conclusions.

9. The Basic Model with Linear Production Costs
Consumers are uniformly distributed over a unit line segment. Each consumer has
inelastic demand for one unit of the good, with reservation price r. We assume r is
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sufficiently large that it is profitable to serve all customers. Two firms engage in spatial
price discrimination and share identical constant marginal cost set to zero without loss of
generality. The transport cost per unit of distance is t and the locations of firm 1 and firm

2 are  and  respectively,    . In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose their
locations and the delivered price schedules are announced in the second stage.
The delivered price schedule for the consumer at x is   , 1

max |  1 |

and Figure 1 depicts the price schedules for the two firms as the outer envelope of the
delivered costs. The market is divided by the indifferent customer who faces the same
delivered price from each firm. That customer is located at
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. Given the

delivered price schedule, the profits of the two firms are



  





  


       



    



    

          




(56)

(57)

and are identified in Figure 1.
Each firm maximizes profit with respective to its own location generating best
response functions
jk : 

Where m1,n

jk : 

 1  m /3  m

 1  m  2m  2 /3  m

(58)

(59)

D1 /Dn is firm j’s conjecture about firm i. The consistent-conjectures

equilibrium requires that the actual derivative along the best response function equal the
conjecture. This requires that each firm correctly anticipates the location movements of
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its rival in response to its own movement and this is built into the maximization. Defining
o1n

*pqC
*r

, W s t and setting o1n

m1n yields m


Simultaneous solution yields λ

and (59) imply that 

equilibrium occurs at 

m

and m

u
;9u

u
;9u

.

1 as the consistent conjectures and then (58)

 . Thus, the firms collocate and the symmetric location





as the symmetry of the problem implies that 

1

 .15 The critical point is that minimum differentiation occurs and both firms earn zero
profits.
The linear production and transport costs have generated an equilibrium that

shares some characteristics with that outside the spatial context. Bresnahan (1981) shows
that a duopoly engaged in quantity competition with linear production costs will adopt
consistent conjectures that result in the competitive quantity being produced and no profit
being earned. While our firms also earn zero profit, the social welfare implications are
obviously very different. With inelastic demand the social welfare is



SW = r – TC where TC
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allowing us to summarize:

Proposition 8: In a simultaneous duopoly location game with constant marginal cost, i)
the Nash conjecture is inconsistent, and ii) the consistent-conjectures equilibrium results
in lower social welfare.
Proof:
i) With Nash, jk : 

ii) LM Z
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0.
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In spatial price discrimination with Nash, each firm locates in the middle of its
own market thereby minimizing social cost. With consistent location conjectures, both
firms locate in the middle of the overall market with their profits equal to zero and with
social cost maximized among the set of symmetric locations.
It is interesting to consider the case where only one firm adopts a consistent
conjecture as this also mimics results known outside the spatial context. Boyer and
Moreaux (1983) show that in a quantity game the firm adopting consistent conjectures
produces the same amount as a Stackelberg leader and that the firm retaining Nash
conjectures produces the same amount as a Stackelberg follower. In our case, if firm 2
retains a Nash conjecture it has a best response function of 


; 


 . Given this firm

;

1 adopts a consistent conjecture of 1/3 regarding firm 2. This results in a best response
function from (58) of 

 .
 


The resulting locations are 2/5 and 4/5 exactly those that

emerge from the two firms sequential location equilibrium as presented by Gupta (1992).
We note that when only one firm adopts a consistent conjecture, the locations obviously
result in lower welfare than with Nash.

10. Quadratic Production Cost
We now remove the assumption of constant marginal cost and assume that firm 1
and firm 2 share identical quadratic cost functions. Gupta (1994) shows that under spatial
price discrimination with convex costs, duopolists locate inefficiently outside the
quartiles. Thus, we want to examine whether the adoption of consistent conjectural
variation can improve social welfare which it obviously cannot do with linear costs.
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We assume quadratic production cost of the form >?




@1 for i=1,2. The

market retains a uniform distribution of customers which for convenience we normalize
to one. We follow Gupta’s assumption that the delivered cost is the sum of marginal
production cost plus transport cost. The equilibrium delivered price schedule for any
consumer located at x is   ,  , 

@1 



max |   |  @  , |  | 

 and is depicted in Figure 2. Here, the indifferent consumer located at


divides the market between the two firms into

and 1 
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The profits of firm 1 and

firm 2 can be expressed as
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The best response functions are
jk : 
jk : 
Setting o





 u 4B+  2+ I 5u 4B  +2B+  5
B+  u 9H 9EB  +2+ I u 9;

 u 4B+  2+ I 5B  +<9u JB+  ;9u J+ I 9u

m and o

B+  u 9H 9EB  +2+ I u 9;

(63)
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m yields the consistent conjectures
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Simultaneously solving (65) and (66) yields two sets of roots but ultimately only one
generates positive profits and locations on the unit line segment:

m

m

2B  <B++  9√2B G 2B I +EB  +  EB+ I
++B

,0

(67)

Returning (67) to (63) and (64) and simultaneously solving yields


B  2B++  9√2B G EB  +  2B I +E+ I B

(68)



9B  +  √2BG EB  +  2B I +E+ I B

(69)

2+B+

2+B+

Plugging (68) and (69) into (61) and (62) yields






9B  9;+BxBB;+ +B 
2+

(70)

Note that if k=0, the equilibrium values above all revert to those from the previous
section with each firm collocating at 1/2.
The total social cost is


SC=  
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(71)

This allows us to identify the consequences of the consistent-conjectures equilibrium.

Proposition 9: With quadratic production cost and two firms, i) the Nash conjecture is
inconsistent, ii) firms locate closer to each other than in Nash; iii) firm profits are lower
than with Nash and iv) social welfare is greater or less than in Nash as @ y 0.313.
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Proof:
i) With Nash, jk : 
o

+  +B

HB+JB  E+ 

ii) In Nash 

  

  

+B
JB+

iv) ∆

HB+JB  E+ 

s m

and 

0; o

E+<B
.
JB+

and jk : 
+  +B

HB+JB  E+ 

J++B



s m

HB+JB  E+ 

0.

J++B

JB I ;+B  ;E+  B+ I
E2+B 

# 0.

. Thus,

xBB;+ +B  4E+  ;+BEB  59H=B  +   B I +;B G J2+ I B+ G

L> ,   L> , 

w

, 0 and

9<B+92B  9+  √2B G EB +  2B I +E+ I B



+   + BB+<B  2+ 

Thus,

<B+2B  +  9√2B G EB  +  2B I +E+ I B

iii) In Nash, 

  

+   + BB+B 

E2+B 

# 0.

9xBB;+ +B  4J+  2+BEB  5HB  +   2B I +;B G 2J+ I B2+ G

Solving z

;+B 

0 yields k=0.313t (given k>0 and t>0). And zL> y 0 as @ { 0.313.

Under consistent conjectures, each firm knows that its rival will move toward the
endpoint as it moves toward the middle and builds this into its optimal location. As a
result, the firms have a greater incentive to move toward the middle and locate closer to
each other under consistent conjectures.
Under Nash conjectures, Gupta (1994) shows that the two firms locate
inefficiently far apart. Yet, when k is small, this deviation from the first best locations
remains small and the movement toward each other caused by introducing consistent
conjectures lowers welfare relative to Nash. This mimics the result with linear costs.
However, when k is large, the deviation from first best locations under Nash is large and
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the movement toward each other caused by consistent conjectures results in welfare
greater than that associated with Nash.

11. Linear Costs with n Firms
We now return to the case of linear costs as in Section 2 but consider n firms
engaging in spatial price discrimination. We show that the Nash equilibrium remains
inconsistent. We consider the cases for n=3 and n=4 showing that very different patterns
of consistent conjectures and locations emerge for odd and even numbers of firms.
Finally, we present an illustrative generalization to n firms for the odd and even number
of firms. The basic conclusion from section 2 remains. The consistent conjecture
equilibria are socially inefficient. It is recognized that this section remains largely an
elaborate simulation and that the conclusions are based largely on induction. A tractable
general analytic solution for any n has proven elusive.

11.1. Nash is Inconsistent
We order the location of the n firms, 1 , i= 1…n, such that 1 , 1 . The

equilibrium delivered price schedule is   , 
  , 1 , 1

P9 if

max  1 , 1 

 

 if 1 

if

  ;

 1 ;   , P9

O P . In Figure 3, the bold envelope depicts the price schedule.

 

Given the delivered price schedule profits can be identified. Firm 1’s profit is
shown in equation (56) and the profit of firm n is
P



Q
RQS TRQ   P9  P 


     P9    P  (72)


Q
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The profit of any representative interior firm is
1

+

2

1  19



 1  19
+

2



 1  1
+

2



(73)

Under Nash, firms 1, n and i maximize (56), (72), and (73) with respect to their own
locations assuming the other locations do not change, a zero conjecture. This generates
three best response functions: jk : 



; 

, jkP : P


;

 ; P9 and jk1 : 1


CT CS
.


Proposition 10: With n firms, the Nash equilibrium is never consistent.
Proof: For interior firms, o1,1
firms, o,


;

s m,

|
}

s m1,1

0 and oP,P9


;

0 and o1,19

s mP,P9

0.




s m1,19

0; for corner

Inconsistency emerges as each firm assumes that its rivals’ locations are fixed
even as the slopes of each best response functions are not zero. The assumptions that
firms make about how their rivals respond to their location changes do not match how
their rivals actually respond.

11.2. Equilibrium when n = 3
Firm 1’s profit is shown in (56). The profits of firm 2 and firm 3 follow from (72)
and (73). Each firm maximizes its own profits given its conjectures about its rivals. Firm
1’s best response function is unchanged from (58) and firm 2’s and firm 3’s best response
functions are
jk : 

 9uI I 9u
9uI 9u

(74)
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 uI 9uI

jk; : ;

;9uI

(75)

The actual responses of firm 2 to the changes in firm 1’s and firm 3’s locations are
o

9uI

9uI 9u

and o;

9u

9uI 9u

. Likewise, firm 1’s and firm 3’s actual responses to

the changes in firm 2’s location are o
solving m

o , m

o , m;

u
;9u

and o;

o; and m;

uI
;9uI

. Simultaneously

o; yields three sets of roots. Two

sets of roots are indeterminate in that they imply relationships between the locations but
no specific locations. Moreover, they involve two firms in a single location. The third set
of roots has the first and third firm making identical conjectures about the middle firm
and the middle firm making two identical conjectures about its two rivals.
m

, m
 ;


, m
 

, m;
H



;

;
H

(76)

Returning (76) into (58), (74) and (75) and solving simultaneously yields


;



, 




, ;

<



(77)

This provides a symmetric equilibrium that has the lowest social cost of any of the
three sets of roots but even it remains too concentrated around the center.17 Social cost is
SC=     2       2 ;       1  ;  




Plugging (77) into (78) yields L> 





0.11. In the Nash equilibrium, the market is

equally divided among these three firms and social cost is equal to 0.0833t.

(78)
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11.3. Equilibrium when n = 4
The profit expressions of firm 1 and firm 2 remain as above. The profit for firm 3
and 4 come from (72) and (73). Again, each firm maximizes its own profits given its
conjectures about its immediate rivals. The best response functions of firm 1 and firm 2
are shown in (58) and (74). Those for firm 3 and 4 are
jk; : ;

 9uGI G 9uI
9uI 9uGI

jk2 : 2

I uIG 9uIG

Simultaneously solving m
m2;

(79)

;9uIG

o , m

(80)

o , m;

o; , m;

o; , m;2

o;2 and

o2; yields two sets of roots neither of which result in definitive locations. As one

set of roots yields two sets of two firms collocating, we adopt that which requires only
one set of two firms collocating. Those roots are

m


;

, m

0, m;

1, m;

1, m;2

0, m2;
 ,
; 


Returning (81) into (58), (74), (79), and (80) yields:




;

; , 2

(81)

; ;


;.


We impose symmetry on these locations which yields locations with the lowest social
cost:


, 


E

;

, 2




H
E

When the number of firms is equal to 4, the social cost can be shown as

(82)
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SC=          ;      2  ;    1  2  

2
2
2





Plugging (82) into (83) yields L> 







(83)

0.0833. The critical point is that using our

assumption of symmetry to try to lower the social cost, it remains clear that consistent
conjectures are inefficient relative to Nash. Under Nash, the efficient locations are 1/8,
3/8, 5/8 and 7/8. And the minimized social cost is equal to 0.0625t.18

11.4. n firms
We now follow the results derived above focusing first on the odd number of
firms and seeking the only set of roots that yield numerical values of each firm’s location.
When the number of firms is even, this remains impossible as it was for 2 and 4 firms.
Every set of roots yields only relationships among locations but no unique locations.
Moreover, there is always at least one pair of firms that collocate. Thus, for even numbers
of firms we limit the set of roots in those in which only a single pair of firms collocate. If
there are more than one such set, we simply adopt that in which the first two interior
firms co-locate and impose symmetry to identify the resulting social cost minimizing
locations.
In examining an odd number of firms, we found no general deductive approach to
show the pattern of resulting roots and locations. Yet, these patterns do emerge in a
straightforward fashion when repeating the consistent conjectures exercise with
increasingly larger number of firms. Thus, we examined the equilibrium with n = 1, 3, 5,
7, 9 and 11 and generalized.19 When the number of firms is odd, the conjectures that
generate specific locations are always of the form: m1,19

;1

P<

and m1,1

P291
P<

when
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i is odd and always of the form m1,19

P;91
PH

and m1,1

1

PH

when i is even. In turn,

these forms result in locations for the firms i=1…n identified as follows:
1

P; 19 PH
P P<

1

1

P

when i is odd

when i is even

The equilibrium locations under consistent conjectures as identified above are shown for
n=1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 in Table 3. The pattern confirms that the locations under consistent
conjectures are too concentrated around the center. The social cost associated with
consistent conjectures is always above that for Nash. The percentage gap between the two
is also shown in Table 3. This gap remains relatively large throughout our examination.
Moreover, while social cost decreases with the number of firms, the decline with Nash
appears faster at least with the range we examine.
We now consider an even number of firms. As described, all potential roots result
in at least one pair of firms co-locating (as we saw with n=2 and n=4). Moreover, none of
the roots define specific locations. Thus, to generalize we continue to limit our attention
to the set of roots that generate only a single case of co-location and we assume that colocation to be by first two interior firms. We then assume symmetry given the resulting
set of roots so as to minimize social cost.20 Again, we build up the pattern by computing
the equilibrium when n = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12.21

m1,1

When the number of firms is even and larger than 2, m
19;
P

when i is odd; m1,19

locations are of the forms:

19

P

and m1,1

P912
P

; m1,19


;

P91;
P

when i is even. And the

and
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1



PJ

when i is equal to 1

1

1; P19J
P9 PJ

1

12 P9
P9 PJ

when i is odd and larger than 1

when i is even

Table 4 illustrates the locations with consistent conjectures. It also isolates the
percentage difference in cost between consistent conjectures and Nash. Again, firm
locations are too concentrated around the center with consistent conjectures. Social costs
are routinely higher than under Nash and, as a percentage, the gap remains large. Again,
social cost declines with the number of firms but within our range (beyond n=2) it
declines faster with Nash.

12. Conclusion
This paper confirms that Nash location conjectures are inconsistent in the
canonical model of spatial price discrimination. The consistent conjectural variation
under duopoly with constant marginal cost equals one and the firms collocate with
minimal differentiation. As a result, both firms earn zero profits. This mimics to some
extent results from a basic quantity game with linear costs but the welfare implications
are reversed. Unlike that basic quality game, consistent conjectures result in lower social
welfare in the location game. We extend the basic model by increasing the number of
firms in the case of linear costs. Firms remain too concentrated around the center and
social welfare continues to be smaller.
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When production costs are convex, the original Nash locations are not optimal
and we show that the consistent conjecture equilibrium can improve the social welfare
with sufficient cost convexity. While this model becomes complex for more than two
firms, the basic point is the contrast between it and the linear cost model. We recognize
that generalizing both the original Nash model and the conjectures model to more than
two firms remains for future work.
Finally, we note that introducing downward sloping demand at each point on the
unit line segment has been shown to generate duopoly locations away from the quartiles
under Nash (Hamilton et al. 1989) even with linear production cost. An interesting future
exploration might examine how consistent locations conjectures would change these
locations.
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THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
III) HOW TO LICENSE A TRANSPORT INNOVATION
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13. Introduction
Economists have long studied how to license a patent for a process innovation
that lowers production cost. Yet, this choice has rarely been cast in a spatial context and
no attention has been paid to innovations that lower transport cost. We change this by
explicitly adopting a model of spatial price discrimination and by determining how to
charge for an innovation that lowers transport costs. Under spatial price discrimination,
transport cost is an essential element in the ability of firms to earn profit as they charge a
price that includes delivery of the product. A firm that reduces its transport cost gains
both customers and profit. Yet, there has been no study of whether to license or how to
charge for an innovation that lowers transport cost.
Improving distribution and lowering transport costs command enormous attention
from businesses. Recently consumer firms Unilever and Evian North American took
internal and reformed their transport management in efforts to reduce costs (Unilever,
2011 and Harps, 2006). More generally, innovations that reduce transport cost include,
but are not limited to, efficient route planning and load tendering, advanced transit
management and tracking, improvements in actual transit technology (be it by any mode
or modes) and reducing time and costs associated with loading/unloading (Stefansson
and Lumsden, 2009).
When transportation and distribution costs comprise a substantial share of overall
costs, economists know there are strong incentives to engage in spatial price
discrimination. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that discriminatory pricing is the preferred
alternative when firms are able to adopt it and Greenhut (1981) identifies it as "nearly
ubiquitous" among actual markets in which the products have substantial freight costs.
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Thus, rather than allow customers to arrange their own delivery, the price quoted for
goods includes delivery. This internalizes transport cost for the firm generating incentives
to lower that cost through innovation. As we will show, this brings to the forefront a
licensing strategy that explicitly includes distance. Such licensing has received little
attention by economists but there exist famous historical examples. Congressional
hearings describe how in 1852 Thomas Sayles licensed the patent of double-acting brakes
to many US railroad companies with a distance fee of $10 per mile (US Senate, 1878).
Earlier in 1843 Charles Wheatstone licensed the patent for the five-needle telegraph also
on a per mile basis. The royalty was ￡20 per mile for any first 10 miles laid with the per
mile charge declining for additional increments (Bowers, 2001).
Outside the spatial context, economists focusing on process innovations often
consider fixed fee licenses or royalty licenses. In basic Cournot competition models, the
fixed fee license is typically superior to per unit royalty licensing when the innovator is
not also producing the product (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1986;
Kamien et al., 1992). Yet, if the innovating firm also produces the product, a royalty
license will be chosen because it provides both licensing fees and a competitive
advantage (Wang, 1998; Kamien and Tauman, 2002).
In the spatial framework, nearly all previous research has been set in Hotelling
type models of price competition. Taking location choices as exogenous both Poddar and
Sinha (2004) and Kabiraj and Lee (2011) emphasize that a royalty will be chosen to
license a production cost reducing innovation. Allowing location to be endogenous but on
a circle, Caballero-Sanz et al (2002) show an outside innovator will adopt a royalty rather
than an auction or a fixed fee. Matsumura et al. (2009) assume a royalty will be the
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licensing method by an inside innovator and show the resulting locations on a line will be
at the end points to maximize the product differentiation. None of these studies considers
spatial price discrimination or a transport cost reducing innovation. Heywood and Ye
(2010) do adopt a spatial price discrimination model but focus on a process innovation
that lowers production costs and so they assume transport cost is constant and unaffected
by the innovation.
In this paper, we first model a duopoly in which one firm innovates to distribute
more cheaply and contemplates licensing this innovation to its rival. We show that under
spatial price discrimination both traditional choices, a fixed fee or a royalty, are
unprofitable. The innovation will simply not be shared. This finding is important in its
own right as they are the traditional licensing mechanisms considered. We go on to show
that when the innovator charges a license fee based on distance, the innovation will be
licensed. We present an initially counter-intuitive result that the innovator will be able to
charge a distance fee that exceeds the cost reduction of the innovation. Yet, we
emphasize that this makes sense as even fees above the cost reduction allow the rival to
earn additional profit because of an accommodating location choice of the innovator. We
describe the licensing equilibrium showing that it increases social welfare relative to not
licensing but that the equilibrium resulting licensing fee is too large to maximize social
welfare.
We next contrast this choice of the distance fee with an outsider who innovates
and decides among the same three licensing methods. Here the innovator earns profit
from any method of licensing but earns the most by charging a fixed fee. Critically, there
is none of the accommodation in location that makes the distance fee so profitable to the
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inside innovator. Depending upon the size of the innovation (the extent to which it lowers
transport costs), the innovator may find it profitable to license to one or both duopolists.
We isolate the unique role played by the prisoner's dilemma. Jointly the duopolists
would prefer not to accept the innovation as reduced transport cost reduces the
profitability of spatial price discrimination. It is the ability of the outside innovator to
craft a dominate strategy that results in both duopolists purchasing the license and in an
improvement in social welfare.
Thus, by uniquely combining spatial price discrimination and an innovation that
lowers transportation costs, we provide a series of new insights. In the final section we
summarize and suggest future avenues of research.

14. An Inside Innovator
The market is normalized to a unit line segment and consumers are uniformly

distributed along the market. Each consumer can buy one unit with reservation price ~.
We assume that ~ is everywhere above the delivered cost of the two competing firms.

The transport costs per unit of distance for the firms are  and  and the locations are 

and  where    . We arbitrarily set a constant per unit production cost to zero and

imagine that firm 1 creates a new technology that lowers its transport cost by c, such that



   , 

, and c<t.

The game consists of three stages. In the first stage, firm 1 decides whether or not
to license to firm 2 and if so, whether to do so by means of a fixed fee F, an output
royalty r or a per unit of distance fee, d. Given the licensing decision made in the first
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stage, both firms simultaneously choose their locations in second stage. The spatial price
schedule is announced in the third stage.
The model is solved by backward induction. We illustrate by first examining the
case of no licensing. The price schedule under discrimination is the outer envelope of the
rivals' delivered costs as shown in Figure 4. For any consumer located at x the price is
 ,  , 

,       . Customers buy from the firm with

max  



lower delivered cost and so the consumer located at

9 + 9+
9+

is indifferent

between firms.22 The general expressions for profits (before paying or receiving
licensing fees) are




   



   


         



     



     

            




(84)

(85)

as identified in Figure 4.
In the second stage, each firm maximizes its own profit with respect to its location

given 

  , 

, and

simultaneously yields 




. Solving the resulting best response functions

and 

2+9
+

;+9

2+9

. Returning these to (84) and (85)

yields



+  ;+9

2+9 
<+  9J+  ;+ I 9 I
2+9 

(86)

(87)
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Note that when c=0 (the firms have the same transport cost), the firms locate at the
quartiles, 


2

and 

;
2

(Hurter and Lederer, 1985) but move increasingly right as c

increases. We now consider the three possible licensing schemes and ultimately compare
 and firm 1's profit under the alternative licensing schemes to determine the final
equilibrium.

14.1. Licensing with a Fixed Fee F

If firm 1 licenses with fixed fee F, 
max     

becomes  ,  , 
a


  ] and a



   and



  . The resulting price schedule

,       . The total profits are

  ], where  and  are (84) and (85) after recognizing that
 


.

Firm 1 and firm 2 have identical transport costs, locate at the quartiles and
a

    ] and a
E
;

;

E

    ]. Firm 1 charges the largest fixed fee

acceptable to firm 2 by making it indifferent to licensing: ]

J+  9;+H 
E+9 

;

E

    

and so
a

E+ I 9J+  +   I
J+9 

(88)

14.2. Licensing with a Per Unit of Output Royalty r


Firm 1 charges a royalty r for each unit sold regardless of distance shipped. Now

   but the price schedule includes r:  ,  , 

      . The resulting profits are q

max 8      

  8 and q

  81 



,
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where 



   and



 +9 + 9
+9

. The expression for the firm 2's profit

shows it paying the royalty on each unit it sells but that firm1 includes r on each unit sold
by either firm. Obviously, it receives r as the payment from firm 2 on the units firm 2
sells but the fact that firm 2's delivered cost is uniformly increased by r means that it
implicitly receives r on all of its own units sold as well.
In the second stage the locations again follow from each firm maximizes profit
with respect to location and simultaneously solving the resulting best response functions.
These locations are functions of t, c and r and when returned to the profit expressions
yield q

  9<E92+<E+9;  + 
E2+9

and q

;2  9J+9+=  2+ 
E2+9

maximizes q with respect to r subject to the constraint that q

. Firm 1

 . The constraint

ensures that the rival will accept the license and it is easy to show that

h
*

, 0 for r less

than that implied by the constraint.23 The solution implied by the constraint is then
8

49;E+9√E  9H+=+  5+9
=+9

E9+√E  9H+=+ 
J9+

q

and q

which generates equilibrium locations q

E9+√E  9H+=+ 
.
E9+

These locations imply that

;2H+ I ;J=+  9EE2+  9<  I ;+922  9JJ+  √E  9H+=+ 
 J+9 

14.3. Licensing with a Per Unit of Distance Fee d

Firm 1 licenses with a fixed rate of d per unit of distance such that 

The equilibrium pricing schedule is  ,  , 

max       

(89)

    .

,  
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    . Substituting 
(84) and (85) yields 

  , 

     


    , and

9 + 9 + 9



9+9

       and 




into

 .

In the second stage the locations again follow from each firm maximizing profit
with respect to location and simultaneously solving the best response functions: 
  9 92++  +  

J  9< 9E+  J+  <+

and 

;  9; 9E+;+  ;+  
J  9< 9E+  J+  <+

. These values are returned

to the profit expressions to yield  and  as shown in Appendix 3. Firm 1 now

maximizes  with respect to d subject to the constraint that 

 . The constraint

again insures that the rival will accept the license and it can be checked that

h
*

, 0 for

all values of d. Thus, the constraint binds and has a single positive real root,   ,  , that
can be solved but is a messy higher order function of c and t (although available upon
request). Critically, the optimal value d that is always above c. We show this by
normalizing t=1 so that c becomes the share of the transport cost eliminated by
innovation and d becomes the share of transport cost being charged as a distance fee. In
this case,   , 

1 

0 only when c itself equals zero and is otherwise positive.24

For example when the innovation reduces transport cost to half of its previous size, c=0.5,
the profit maximizing distance fee is   =0.657.

We will show that the optimal choice is to license with the distance fee d but first
we explain the effect of d on locations and why the optimal d is greater than c. We do this
in a proposition that highlights the accommodating response of the innovator to a large
distance fee.
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Proposition 11: i)
 , 0.
Proof: i)
*

*

*

*

*

*

, 0 and

*
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, 0;

9+ 9;+

9+ ;+9  ;++9 + 

9+ ;+9  ;++9 + 

 

*


# 0;
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, 0.

Given that firm 2 has the new transport technology, as d increases firm 2 has increasingly
higher transport costs than firm 1 and, as a consequence, the optimal locations of both
firms move right. Critically, when d=c, each firm has identical transport costs to those
without licensing but the locations differ from those without licensing. Firm 1 locates less
aggressively, closer to the left as shown by ii), as it earns licensing revenue that grows
with the market share of firm 2. The more accommodating location of firm 1 implies that
when d=c, firm 2 also moves left and so earns profits above what it earned without the
new technology despite having the same transport costs. Thus, firm 1 can actually
increase the value of d above c moving both firms right until firm 2 earns profit identical
to its no licensing case.25 This ability of firm 1 to dramatically increase licensing revenue
through an accommodating location sets up the final equilibrium.
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14.4. The Equilibrium
The choice of licensing scheme follows from comparing the profit of firm 1 in the
four cases outlined.

Proposition 12: i) Fixed fee and royalty licensing are never profitable; ii) The only
profitable license uses a unit distance fee.
Proof:
i) Subtracting (86) from (88) yields a  

yields q  
ii)  

J  J2+9



  



;+

J+9

# 0. Subtracting (86) from (89)

<  I 9;J=+  E;<+  9E2+ I 22  9;+JJ+  √E  9H+=+ 
 J+9 

9+ I 4E I 9+ I 59=+  9H++9  9<+9 + 
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, 0;

*h
*

+9 I I <+9 G   E +9 F ;EJ+9 
  < +9 J+9  I

above analysis, we have already known that   ,  so  

# 0.

, 0. From the

    , 0.

The best fixed fee is not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantage of facing a rival
with equal transport costs. Similarly, the royalties earned per unit of output and the
resulting increased production cost of firm 2 do not outweigh the disadvantage of facing a
rival with equal transport costs. Only when firm 1 can not only maintain but expand its
transport cost advantage will it make sense to license and the licensing scheme that can
accomplish this is dependent upon distance.

15. Illustrating the Consequences of the Licensing Equilibrium
We now illustrate the equilibrium that uses the distance fee. We first present a
simulation of the locations for different size innovations and contrast those with the
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locations that happen without licensing. We then show that the equilibrium with licensing
improves social welfare relative to that without licensing but that it generates a licensing
fee that is too large to maximize social welfare.
To get a sense of the impact of the distance fee licensing on firms’ locations we
consider a series of cost reductions associated with innovation, c = 0.1t, …, 0.9t. For each
of the nine values from a 10 percent reduction in costs to a 90 percent reduction in costs,
we calculate the equilibrium locations associated with no licensing and with the licensing
equilibrium we have derived. These are presented in Table 5 and illustrate that the two
firms move to the right in either equilibrium as c increases. Critically, for any given value
of c, the licensee locates further to the right under the licensing equilibrium than in the
case of no licensing. At the same time, the innovator locates further to the left under the
licensing equilibrium than under the case of no licensing. Thus, the availability of
licensing pushes the firms toward the corners. The movement right by the licensee is
generally far smaller than the accommodating movement of the innovator left.
The consequence of licensing on social welfare depends, in part, on these
movements. Any movement toward symmetry improves welfare as does the fact that
fewer real resources are used to transport the goods of the licensee.
Now, we compare the social welfare with and without licensing. The social
welfare (SW) follows as the difference between total willingness to pay and the real
transport cost (TC): SW = ~ – TC. The transport cost under no licensing is: i> 
   



9 + 9+
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. The transport cost under distance fee licensing is: i> 
 



      


 



where





   

     1    . Note that the real
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transport cost per unit for firm 2 does not include the licensing transfer to firm 1 yet that
transfer influences the location of the indifferent consumer so that
9 + 9 + 9
9+9



. The social welfare under no licensing is: LM 

~

++9

2+9

but

the social welfare under distance fee licensing remains a higher order function of c and t.
By again normalizing t=1, both social welfare functions can be easily graphed over the
range of c. These are shown in Figure 5 and make clear that LM

0 #  # . Licensing improves welfare.



 LM  , 0 for all

While it is clear that a governmental authority concerned with welfare should
allow licensing with a distance fee, it may wish to control the size of that fee. On the one
hand, a fee of zero would result in efficient locations at the quartiles and minimize the
real resources spent on transportation.26 The problem with setting such a fee is that it
lowers the profit of firm 1 and so licensing will not happen. Thus, we explore whether
there exists a governmentally set fee that maximizes the increase in welfare associated
with licensing subject to the constraint that the innovator has an incentive to license.
We have already shown that the profit of firm 1 increases in d and it can be shown
that social welfare decreases in d. Thus, the welfare maximizing fee is that which makes
firm 1 indifferent to licensing and that this fee is lower than the equilibrium level. When
one solves the implied constraint that  in the appendix equals  it yields a higher
order polynomial root that can again be easily graphed. Figure 6 shows   #   and
while   , ,   #  for all 0 #  # . The distances associated with the socially

optimal fee are illustrated in Table 5. They show that both firms locate to the left of either
the no-licensing case or the licensing equilibrium. The smaller fee promotes the leftward
accommodation of the innovator but does not allow it to be fully exploited. Indeed, it can
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be confirmed that the profitability of the rival increases as a result of the licensee even as
that of innovator remains the same as without licensing. The total transport costs are
illustrated in Table 6 showing the welfare maximizing costs to be lowest but closer to
those in the licensing equilibrium than the costs in that equilibrium are to those in the
case without licensing.
We recognize that we have illustrated only the solution to the static problem of
how to price an existing innovation. We have not modeled the R&D process and a
governmental authority concerned with providing optimal dynamic incentives for
innovation might adopt an alternative fee. This would presumably be higher and provide
a licensing return to the innovator raising the traditional issues of dynamic vs. static
efficiency common in studying patents.

16. An Outside Innovator
We now consider a transport cost-reducing innovation from a market outsider.

The basics of the framework remain identical but now without licensing 

with licensing 1



 and

  . The game again consists of three stages. In the first stage, the

outsider now decides whether to license and if so, by which method and to how many
firms. We consider the same three potential licensing fees. In the second stage the firms
decide whether or not to accept the license and then simultaneously locate. In the third
stage, the price schedule is announced.
We again solve by backward induction and first review the no licensing case. The

consumer located at x is charged  ,  , 

profits are 

 and 

max  

,    . Firm

 where  and  are (84) and (85) after substituting
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. With identical transport cost per unit of distance, firms

locate at the quartiles and




;

E



(90)

Obviously, the outside innovator earns no profit in this case, L=0 (where L denotes the
outside innovator’s licensing revenue).

16.1. Licensing with a Fixed Fee F




If the outside innovator licenses to both firms with a fixed fee ], L=2] and
  . The price schedule is  ,  , 

 . The total profits are a

(85) with 
;

E



   and

  ] and a



 


max     

,     

  ] where  and  are (84) and

. The firms locate at quartiles and a

a

    ]. Importantly, if the firms were to cooperatively decide, they would not

accept the license as both the fixed fee and the lower transport cost reduce profits.
However, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, there exists the fear that the rival will accept
the innovation if one firm unilaterally declines. We describe the resulting prisoner's
dilemma.
Imagine only firm 1 purchases the license, then a

where 

  , 

, and



9 + 9+
9+

 F1 and a



. In the second stage each firm

maximizes its profit with respect to its location and solving the resulting best response
functions simultaneously yields the equilibrium locations. These locations yield a

65
+  ;+9

2+9



F1 and a

<+  9J+  ;+ I 9 I
2+9 

. The fixed fee F1 makes firm 1 indifferent

about buying the innovation and is determined by subtracting (90) from

L=F1

+  ;+9

.
2+9 

Thus

+J+9;
E+9 

(91)

Thus, for any fixed fee less than or equal to F1 firm 1 purchases the license when its rival
doesn’t. If firm1, indeed, purchases the license, firm 2 could be better off by also
purchasing the license. The profit for each firm if both firms purchase the license is
;

E

   – ] which can be compared to a . Firm 2 thus purchases the license

whenever the fixed fee is less than or equal to E     a
;

J+  9;+H 
E+9 

] .

It can be shown that ]  < F1 and thus it is the largest fee that will make purchasing the
license a dominant strategy for each firm. The outsider’s licensing revenue is


2] 

J+  9;+H 
J+9 

(92)

By comparing the licensing revenue in (91) to that in (92), the outside innovator
decides whether to license to one firm or two firms.

Proposition 13: The outside innovator licenses by a fixed fee to both firms when
0 #  # .427 and to only one firm when . 427 #  # .

Proof: Subtracting (91) from (92) yields

J+  9;+    I
E+9 

which when set equal to zero

and solved yields c=.427t and the sign can be checked either side of this critical value.
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When two licenses are sold, equilibrium locations remain at the quartiles.
Moreover, because of the need to make licensing a dominant strategy for both firms, the
profit of each firm increases as a result of licensing. If only a single firm is licensed, the
full value of the cost reduction is extracted by the innovator. Which strategy is chosen
depends on the relative size of c to t. When c is small relative to t, a single firm with
access to the technology gains relatively little market share and as a consequence it less
profitable to sell only one license. When the cost reduction is large, extracting the full
value can be more profitable as the single licensed firm gains substantial market share.

16.2. Licensing with an Output Royalty r

If the outside innovator licenses to both firm 1 and firm 2 with an output royalty 8

for each unit sold then 

    



   and the price schedule is  ,  , 

max 8 

, 8        . As both firms pay 8 per unit, the royalty

influences neither locations nor the resulting profits. Thus, 
 and  are (84) and (85) with 



   and



exceed the delivered costs by assumption, L= 8 and 

 and 

 





 , where

. As ~ continues to

;

E

   . While the

firms no longer lose profit to a fixed fee, they continue to earn less than without the
technology and the prisoner’s dilemma remains.
If only firm 1 purchases the patent, 

schedule becomes  ,  , 
are 

with 

  (r1)  and 

  , 

, and



max  

 (r1)(1 

  , 
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. The price

, (r1)      . Firm profits


+ + 9 9
+9

,and 

), where  and  are (84) and (85)

. In the second stage, each firm

maximizes its profit over its own location and simultaneously solving the resulting best
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response functions yields equilibrium locations. Returning these locations to outside
innovator’s licensing revenue and firms’ profits yields 



 +9
+9

and

 9+  ;+9

(93)

+ 9  ;+9

(94)

2+9 

2+9 

Firm 1 gains the market advantage of lower transport cost but must pay the royalty. The
outsider maximizes royalty income and it can be shown that * , 0 for all royalties that
*

would induce firm 1 to purchase the license. Thus, the outside innovator chooses r1 so
9E+  +√;E+ G 92J+ I +    9; I +

that (93) equals the profit without licensing in (90): r1=

29;+

.

The resulting licensing revenue is

L=(r1)



+9;  +9+  x;+;+9 +9 
J;+9 +9

(95)

If firm 1 purchases the license, firm 2 might also be better off purchasing the license.
When two licenses are sold, the profit of each firm is E    which equals (94) when
;

8

92   +9E+  √E G 9;=+ I =;  +  9=E+ I ;E+ G
2;+9

It can be shown 8  <r1 and thus both firms will purchase the license as a dominant

strategy for any royalty less than or equal to 8  . Thus, when selling to two firms L=8  .
The optimal number of firms to be licensed can be determined.

(96)
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Proposition 14: The outside innovator licenses by an output royalty to both firms when
0 #  # .847 and to only one firm when . 847 #  # .
Proof: Subtracting (95) from (96) yields
H2+ I 9J G 9<+     + I 9;E+ G 94 +9  9+  5x;  9H+;+  +9  2+9E+  x;+;+9 +9 
J;+9 ;+9 +9

which when set equal to zero and solved yields c=.847t and the sign can be checked
either side of this critical value.

Again, if both firms are licensed the locations remain at the quartiles. The outside
innovator collects the smaller royalty but for all units sold in the market. With one
license, it collects the larger royalty but only on the units of one firm. The share of the
market for that one firm is larger when c is larger. Thus, only for large values of c, will
the higher royalty fee cause the outsider to sell only to one firm. This largely mimics the
result with the fixed fee.

16.3. Licensing with a Per Unit of Distance Fee d

If the outside innovator licenses to both firms with a distance fee , then 



    . The price schedule is  ,  , 

    }. Substituting 



 and 

;



E

     .

     and



 





  



       . Each firm earns 




,    

into (84) and (85) yields

 . The outside innovator’s total income is L


         





max       
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If only firm 1 purchases the patent then 

schedule is  ,  , 
 
and



 and  

    1 and 

,     1    }. Firms’ profits are

max  

 where  and  are (84) and (85) with 

9 + 9   9+
9+9 

. The price

    1, 


 1  

. The outside innovator’s revenue is 



,

   1     . In stage 2, each firm maximizes its profit with respect to its



own location and simultaneously solving the resulting best response functions yields
equilibrium locations. Returning the equilibrium locations to the outside innovator’s
licensing revenue and each firm’s profit yields 
 
 

  +

2+9  

and

+  9  ;+

2+9  

(97)

;+9  +9  
2+9  

(98)

The outside innovator maximizes  with respect to 1 subject to the constraint that (97)
*

is larger than or equal to (90). It can be checked that *
the constraint. Thus, 1=c and L= E .




, 0 for values of 1 that meet

Thus, for any distance fee less than or equal to 1 firm 1 will purchase the license

when its rival doesn’t. If firm 1 has the innovation, firm 2 could be better off by also
purchasing the license. The maximum amount the second firm will pay is given by
setting 

;

E

     equal to (98) and solving. Thus,  

 and the outside

innovator will charge c no matter how many firms are licensed and so will license both
firms. With two licenses sold, the licensing revenue is
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J



(99)

In this case there is no tradeoff between a higher licensing fee and the number of firms
licensed.

16.4. The Equilibrium
The final equilibrium reflects the outsider's choice of licensing scheme.

Proposition 15: For an outside innovator all three forms of licensing are profitable but
charging a fixed fee is the most profitable.
Proof: A piecewise comparison of L across all values of c from 0 to t for each licensing
scheme shows the fixed fee dominates. This comparison is presented in Figure 7.

The optimal distance fee is charged to both firms and as a consequence, the
licensing revenue is simply linear in c from (99). For either a fixed fee or the royalty a
single firm is licensed with large enough c. The inflection points from propositions (13)
and (14) are illustrated in Figure 7. Because paying a fixed fee gives the single licensed
firm a bigger cost advantage and market share, the inflection comes at smaller c than for
the royalty. As a consequence of this larger advantage, the value of the license is greatest
to a single firm when paying a fixed fee making it the optimal single license for the
outsider. Importantly, this large advantage for the single licensed firm means the greatest
competitive harm to the excluded rival. As a consequence, the excluded rival will pay
the most to receive a second license under the fixed fee. Thus, regardless of whether
licensing to one or two firms the fixed fee will be chosen
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As in the case of an insider innovating, licensing improves social welfare. Social
welfare remains the difference between total willingness to pay and real transport cost.
With two licenses sold, the reduction in unit transport cost improves social welfare
without changing firms’ locations relative to the no licensing case. Moreover, these
locations are first best. When only one firm is licensed the fact that asymmetric locations
emerge is outweighed by the fact that transport costs are lower for most of the market.27
Yet, the locations are not first best and a social planner would prefer licensing to both
firms.

17. Conclusion
This paper is unique in studying the licensing of transport cost-reducing
innovation. We recognize that such an innovation can be critical under spatial price
discrimination in which the consumer pays a delivered price. While the Cournot quantity
model argues that royalties are preferable to fixed fees for an insider, we show that both
of these fee structures are impossible for the innovation we study. Neither generates
profit and it is simply better for the innovator to enjoy lower transport cost. We show that
only a per distance fee can provide the innovator with both licensing revenue and a
superior competitive position.
When innovator is outside the market, we show that the fixed fee license always
generates the highest licensing revenue. This result in some ways mimics that from
simply Cournot competition. Like that case the innovator can extract the most revenue
but the mechanism differs. Specifically, we demonstrate the importance of the prisoner's
dilemma as jointly the firms would prefer not to have the innovation that inherently limits
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the profitability of spatial price discrimination. It is only the fear that the rival will
purchase the license that allows the innovator to establish a dominant strategy in which
each firm pays for the license. This differs from the case of process innovation in the
Cournot quantity model. We show that as for high levels of c, the outsider will prefer to
sell to only one firm.
There are a number of possible extensions of this work. One of our basic
assumptions has been that regardless of the licensing decisions, the full market is served.
This could be modified. First, when the reservation price is low enough, purchasing the
license could lower transport cost so that the firms could acquire new customers. Second,
when the innovator is an insider, the location advantage associated with lower transport
cost becomes muted. This may imply that fixed fee licensing and the royalty licensing
could be profitable and even change the relative ordering. Finally, one might consider
downward sloping demand curves at each point in the market suggesting another gain to
the firms from purchasing the license.
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Appendix A: Proposition 1
Case 1: Both firms use delegation
Equation (11) gives the payoffs with delegation.
Case 2: Both firms do not use delegation
Plugging 

yields 



1/4 and 
.188.

3/4 (Hurter and Lederer 1985) into equations (1) and (2)

Case 3: Only Firm 1 adopts delegation (symmetric to only Firm 2 adopting delegation)
Imaging that owner 1 adopts delegation and owner 2 does not. With backward
induction, we know the pricing equilibrium and first solve the location game. Firm 1’s
manager maximizes equation (3) and Firm 2’s owner maximizes equation (2) as !

1.

Solving the best response functions yields the locations:




2!   3  3! /8! 
6!   1  ! /8! 

Returning these to equation (1), the incentive parameter chosen by the owner of Firm 1 is:
!

5/2  5

Returning this value to the locations above and to equations (1) and (2) yields:


.4 and 

.8, 

.2, and 

.12

The payoffs are all shown in Table 1 revealing delegation as a dominant strategy for each
owner.
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Appendix B: Delegation with Convex Costs and Proposition 6
Case 1: Both firms use delegation
Equation (26) gives the payoffs with delegation.
Case 2: Both firms do not use delegation
Plugging 

2  @ /8@   and 

6  7@ /8@   (Gupta 1994) into

equations (19) and (20) yields:




;B  +;EB+  + I JBI
E2B+ 

Case 3: Only Firm 1 adopts delegation (symmetric to only Firm 2 adopting delegation)
In the location game Firm 1’s manager maximizes equation (3) and Firm 2’s owner
maximizes equation (20) to generate best response functions and locations as a function
of Firm 1's delegation parameter. In stage 2, ! is chosen by Firm 1’s owner to
maximize his profit. Returning ! to locations yields:



42B G =+B I ;B  +   B+ I 2+ G 5

;+B I J=B  +  2 B+ I E2B G  + G
HEB G =H+B I ;B  +   JB+ I E+ G
;+B I J=B  +  2 B+ I E2B G  + G

Given above locations, firms’ profits are:



EB F JJ+B G <<B I +  HJB  + I E B+ G J+ F
;+B I J=B  +  2 B+ I E2B G  + G

HB  2E<+B  JEJB  +  ;=<B  + I HH2B F + G 2 E;+ F B G  =E +  BI H==+  B  JE2+  B2J+ 
;+B I J=B  +  2 B+ I E2B G  + G 
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Subtracting Firm 2’s profit in case 3 from Firm 2’s profit in case 1 yields:
+ I 42<2HEB F + F E=<EB  +2JHEB  + HB  2HJB  + I ; EB  + G 2E<JE2B G +  ; JB I +   2J B  +  E 2JB+  <E+  5
JJB  H+BE+   J=B  +  2 B+ I E2B G ;B I + + G 

Thus, the owner of Firm 2 will delegate if Firm 1 delegates and symmetry implies that
the owner of Firm 1 will delegate if Firm 2 delegates. Subtracting Firm 1’s profit in case
2 from Firm 1’s profit in case 3 yields:
+ I 4B G JB I +2B  +  ;B+ I E+ G 5

E2J=B  +  2 B+ I E2B G ;BI + + G B+ 

,0

Thus, Firm 1’s owner will delegate if Firm 2 does not delegate and symmetry implies that
the owner of Firm 2 will delegate if Firm 1 does not delegate. Thus, each firm has a
dominant strategy of delegation.
Note that the proof of proposition 6 i) follows from subtracting Firm 1’s profit in
case 2 from Firm 1’s profit in case 1:


+  EB F <B G +;=B I +  HJ2B  + I 2EB+ G + F
E2JB  HB+E+   B+ 

Thus, the dominant strategy reduces profit.

#0
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Appendix C:


 J  9<


9E+  J+  <+



24 H  120 2  88 2   352 ;  

114 ;    240   ;  528      342     240 ;    75   ; 

26 2  150;  352 ;  342     120 2   4 H  75   ; 
26 2  114 ;    88 2   24 H






J  9< 9E+  J+  <+



12 H  60 2  16 2   64 ;   7 ;   

120   ;  96      21     120 ;       ;  2 ;  64 ; 
21     60 2   12 H     ;  7 ;    16 2 
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Fig.1. Spatial price discrimination in duopoly competition

Note: The thick line is the delivered price schedule with 1 the profit
earned on the difference between the schedule and the delivered cost.
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Fig.2. Spatial price discrimination with quadratic production cost
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Fig.3. Spatial price discrimination with n firms
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Fig.4. Spatial price discrimination in duopoly competition

Note: The delivered price schedule is depicted by the thick lines and 1 is Firm i’s
profit earned on the difference between the price schedule and the delivered cost.
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Fig.5. Social welfare and the distance fee licensing

Notes: i) LM represents social welfare with the socially optimal distance fee,

LM represents social welfare with the equilibrium distance fee, LM  represents social
welfare without licensing. ii) Inelastic demand implies that social welfare is the
willingness to pay ~ minus the real resources spent on transportation.
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Fig.6. Equilibrium distance fee and socially optimal distance fee

Note:   represents the equilibrium distance fee and   represents the socially optimal
distance fee.

90

Fig.7. Representation of proposition 15

Note: L is the licensing revenue of outside innovator.
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Table 1. Payoffs from the basic model

Firm 2

Firm 1

Delegation

No Delegation

Delegation

.139t, .139t

.2t, .12t

No Delegation

.12t, .2t

.188t, .188t
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Table 2. Equilibrium results with and without delegation under elastic demand

t
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8

!
D
0.968
0.938
0.911
0.885
0.861
0.838
0.817
0.797

!
ND
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

 1  
D
ND
0.338
0.253
0.342
0.257
0.348
0.261
0.353
0.265
0.359
0.270
0.365
0.276
0.372
0.282
0.379
0.289


D
0.013
0.024
0.034
0.041
0.048
0.052
0.056
0.058


ND
0.018
0.033
0.046
0.056
0.065
0.071
0.076
0.079

Note: D stands for “delegation” and ND stands for “no delegation”.

SW
D
0.486
0.471
0.455
0.438
0.422
0.404
0.387
0.370

ND
0.487
0.472
0.456
0.439
0.421
0.403
0.383
0.364
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Table 3. Equilibrium locations for odd numbers of firms

n
3


5
7
9
11

Social Cost Gap

Locations
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, 2

, H
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;

0.2427

, H

, E

<
J
;
H

, <

;
H2

, J

<
=

0.2795
;
2

<
2


;

, <

, J

, =

;
J
2
H

, =

, 

;
J

0.2912
<


H
E

0.2945
, 

2<
H2

Note: The Social Cost Gap is the difference in social cost between the consistent
conjecture equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium divided by the social cost of the
consistent conjecture equilibrium. n – number of firms

0.2950
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Table 4. Equilibrium locations for even numbers of firms

n
2
4


6
8
10
12

Social Cost
Gap

Locations
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0.5
H
E

0.2497

H
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, <

<
2

;

;;
H

, J

, =

E
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0.2898

=

2

;
2

, J

, =

J
H
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<
J

0.3208

, 

H
E

;=

H

, 

J
=

0.3388
2;
H

, 

Note: The Social Cost Gap is the difference in social cost between the consistent
conjecture equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium divided by the social cost of the
consistent conjecture equilibrium. n – number of firms

=



0.3491
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Table 5. Locations and distance fee licensing

c
0.1t
0.2t
0.3t
0.4t
0.5t
0.6t
0.7t
0.8t
0.9t



 , 

(0.263, 0.763)
(0.278, 0.778)
(0.294, 0.794)
(0.313, 0.813)
(0.333, 0.833)
(0.357, 0.857)
(0.385, 0.885)
(0.417, 0.917)
(0.455, 0.955)

Locations

 , 
(0.256, 0.765)
(0.265, 0.782)
(0.276, 0.799)
(0.290, 0.818)
(0.308, 0.840)
(0.330, 0.863)
(0.357, 0.890)
(0.392, 0.920)
(0.438, 0.956)


 , 
(0.253,0.759)
(0.258,0.770)
(0.266,0.784)
(0.277,0.801)
(0.292,0.821)
(0.314,0.846)
(0.343,0.876)
(0.382,0.911)
(0.433,0.953)




′
Note: i) 
1 is Firm i’s location associated without licensing, 1 is Firm i’s location with

the equilibrium distance fee, and 1 is Firm i’s location given the socially optimal


′
′

distance fee. ii) The illustration makes clear that 
 ,  ,  and  ,  ,  .
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Table 6. Transport costs with and without distance fee licensing

c
0.1t
0.2t
0.3t
0.4t
0.5t
0.6t
0.7t
0.8t
0.9t

i> 
0.118t
0.111t
0.103t
0.094t
0.083t
0.071t
0.058t
0.042t
0.023t

i>
0.113t
0.102t
0.091t
0.081t
0.071t
0.061t
0.049t
0.037t
0.021t


i>
0.112t
0.101t
0.089t
0.078t
0.068t
0.058t
0.047t
0.036t
0.020t


Note: i) i>  is the transport cost without licensing, i> is the transport cost with the

equilibrium distance fee, and i> is the transport cost given the socially optimal
distance fee. ii) Inelastic demand implies that social welfare is the willingness to pay ~
minus the real resources spent on transportation.
′
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Endnotes
1

Applications include mergers (González-Maestre and López-Cuñat 2001), mixed

oligopolies (Barros 1995) and capital investment decisions (Baiman and Rajan 1995).
2

We note that an uncovered market occurs in spatial price discrimination only when the

firms' transport costs no longer constrain pricing and so there is no competition or need to
discriminate.
3

Outside the spatial context, researchers have considered partial delegation at both earlier

and at later stages of multi-stage games (Gautier and Paolini 2007; Moner – Colonques et
al. 2004; Tomaru et al. 2011).
4

The only way a manager could increase output in the pricing stage is to price below its

own delivered cost to the rival’s customers. Regardless of the pricing response of the
rival, this can never imply a profit gain to the original owner. Moreover, managers will
not deviate from spatial price discrimination if delegated the ability to reduce by ε the
delivered pricing schedule in the final stage. This follows because managers can always
gain market share with a smaller profit loss by changing location rather than by lowering
the price schedule. Contact the authors for this demonstration.
5

This point is easily seen from either manager's first order condition. For example,

*^

*

! *   1  !
*h



*
*

! Z

;+




+


[

9:


0. Here the profit loss

associated with moving toward the center grows with t for any given increase in output as


1   and 2 #  # .
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6

One of the advantages of spatial models is that by providing an additional dimension to

problems they can modify or reverse predictions. For a recent example using spatial
price discrimination see Heywood and Ye (2011).
7

In general the first-mover advantage can be lost if there are high costs for observing the

leading firm’s choice (Vardy 2004), or if the actions of the leader and the follower are
strategic complements (Gal-Or 1985).
8

Mathematically, returning (14) and (15) to (1) yields the leader’s profit,  , as a
*h

function of the incentive parameters: *:
9

From (15) it can be checked that

10

11

13

*+

H:I +

O 0 w !

1.

, 0 for ! # ! .

A proof analogous to that for Proposition 1 is available from the authors.
Equating the delivered prices from the two firms: @

 
12

*



9:







=

B+ 
B+



 



 

@1 





.

Subtracting (9) from (23) yields +B 

B+;BJ+

EB  ; B+2+  B+  2+ I +;

O 0 for @ O 0.

Thus airline flights between city pairs differ by departure time from early morning to

late evening, the editorial policies of newspapers differ from liberal left to conservative
right, and breakfast cereals differ in their sugar content.
14

A somewhat different approach to establishing price conjectures is outlined by Norman

(1989).
15

Indeed, even without invoking the symmetric location assumption we will show that

when the linear case is thought of as the limit of decreasing convexity, the two firms can
be shown to collocate at the middle.
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16

Equating the delivered prices from the two firms allows solving for

@



17

 



 

@1 



  







=

B+ 
B+



as follows:

.

The other two roots yield consistent conjectures that imply two of the three firms locate

at the same place and even if we locate the three firms optimally (given the relationship
between them), they have higher social cost than that implied by the locations in (77).
18

Firms 2 and 3 co-locate and earn no profit.

19

The derivations of the consistent conjectures location equilibria for the larger odd

values of n are available upon request.
20

We recognize that we are presenting a case with small deviations from Nash but our

objective is to identify how substantial those deviations remain even in such a case. The
full set of roots and potential locations becomes unwieldy as n increases. Yet, the fact
that they all involve at least one case of collocation demonstrates that they are all less
efficient than Nash.
21

The derivations of the consistent conjectures location equilibria for the larger even

values of n are available upon request.
22

Equating the delivered prices from the two firms:  
9 + 9+


23

9+



=    



  w

.

While solving the constraint for r yields two roots, only one returns locations within

the unit market.
24

While the expressions are complicated, this demonstration is available upon request.


25 *h

*



+9  G +9 I I <+9 G  =E +9 F 2 +9 
  < +9 J+9  I

# 0.
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26

Returning 

  9 92++  +  

J  9< 9E+  J+  <+

and 

;  9; 9E+;+  ;+  
J  9< 9E+  J+  <+

to i> 

and minimizing with respect to d yields d=0.
27

i>   i>




J



++9

2+9

cost without licensing and i>

+



J+9

, 0 where i>  represents the total transport

represents the total transport cost with one license sold.
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